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I. INTRODUCTION
This case is at root about the Courts' authority to sanction Sondra Kantor in a breach of
contract case set for jury trial in a district court. Respondent's contentions that the contract was
somehow altered to permit Robert Kantor to obtain a conveyance of the property from Sondra
Kantor are erroneous. The district court's order and enforcement of that agenda were in error.
The contract between the parties was the basis of their divorce. The divorce was the
reason for the contract.

The parties in this case, as parties to that contract, selected their

enforcement remedy by permitting the contract to be merged in the future. They contracted for
two things that are fundamental to this appeal: 1) the Property Settlement Agreement could be
merged at any time upon request of either party; and 2) the Golden Eagle property was to be sold
"as soon as possible." Those contractual obligations remained in effect until the contract was
merged into the Supplemental Decree. That was the pertinent part of the parties' agreement.
There was no effective modification of the PSA between Robert and Sondra Kantor. The
September 12, 2013 oral agreement did not require Sondra to convey the property to Robert
without any consideration by way of removal from the debt. The loan modification was not a
refinance.

It was a loan modification.

A loan modification would not necessarily release

Sondra's name from the associated mortgage with Bank of America. Sondra's cooperation in
such an endeavor was not required by the PSA or by the September 12, 2013 oral agreement. If
anything, this record clearly demonstrates that there was no "meeting of the minds" on
September 12, 2013 as to the material terms of Robert's pursuit of the loan modification. Even if
there was an agreement reached on September 12, 2013, Robert immediately violated it by

Appellant/Cross-Respondent's Reply Brief

pg. 4

seeking further injunctive relief in the form of a court order requiring Sondra to deed the
property to Robert. His own conduct belies any agreement.
In following Robert's agenda and the pursuit of the loan modification, the district court
erred. Its errors were compounded by the administration of sanctions that served no purpose
except punishment. This Court can right those wrongs and restore Sondra (and Robert) to the
agreement they reached to dissolve their marital estate -now merged into the Supplemental
Decree of Divorce, Just as the parties agreed could be done in their w1itten contract.
Until recent developments in the implementation of Rule 54, the merger doctrine was the
law of the land in Idaho.

Although admittedly the district courts had power to administer

divorces historicaHy, that power was relegated to the magistrate's division. Thus, it is proper in
this case that the magistrate court handle this case. The magistrate court had original jurisdiction
over the parties and over the subject matter of their divorce. The parties' effectively consented
to that forum to administer the contract by agreeing that it could be merged in the future. In fact,
Idaho Code§§ 32-712 and 32-713 require that the divorce court dispose of the community estate.
The subsequent merger was essentially nothing more than the division of omitted assets and
debts that had not been previously divided by the magistrate. The law in Idaho establishes that
once merged, the contractual rights give way to the court's order.
As set forth below, Respondent's arguments must fail.

II. ARGUMENT
A.

THE SEPTEMBER 12, 2013 ORAL STIPULATION AND RESULTING

ORDER WERE NOT VALID MODIFICATIONS OF THE PSA.
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Sondra does not dispute that the parties attempted to enter into an agreement on
September 12, 2013. However, as set forth in Sondra's original briefing, the PSA should not be
disregarded based solely on the September 12, 2013 hearing and the oral stipulation. Young
Electric Sign Co. v. Winder, 135 Idaho 804, 808, 25 P.3d 117, 121 (2001). In this case, the

parties' stipulation was further reduced to a written order. R., Vol. III, p. 659-60. Robert's
"implied" term that Sondra would be required to convey the property to him to facilitate the loan
modification without any release from the related mortgage is absent from the record. R., Vol.
III, p. 659-60; Tr., Vol. I, p. 173, 1. 14 - p. 178, 1. 6.

In point of fact, the district court

acknowledged that no such requirement existed. Tr., Vol. II, p. 56, LI. 5-8.
"An attempted stipulation is ineffective when it is clear from the record that the parties
never assented to it." Lawrence v. Hutchinson, 146 Idaho 892, 898, 204 P .3d 532, 538 (Ct.App.
2009) (citing Ko/iring v. Robertson, 137 Idaho 94, 99, 44 P.3d 1149, 1154 (2002)). For the
September 12, 2013 oral stipulation and resulting order to be an effective modification of the
PSA, there must have been a "meeting of the minds" and a mutual assent to contract. Lawrence,
146 Idaho 898, 204 P.3d 538. "A contract must be complete, definite, and certain in all its
material terms, or contain provisions that are capable in themselves of being reduced to
certainty." Id.

In this case, the parties simply did not agree that Sondra would convey the

property to Robert to facilitate the loan modification. A party to a contract cannot modify its
terms without the assent of the other party. Ore-Ida Potato Products, Inc. v. Larsen, 83 Idaho
290, 362, P.2d 384 (1961).

Thus, the district court's pursuit of such a conveyance was an

improper exercise of its power.
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In Kohring, the Court reviewed an oral stipulation placed on the record and found that
although the parties had expressed a future intent to do a separate writing, all essential terms of
the agreement were discussed on the record. Kohring, 137 Idaho 100-01, 44 P.3d 1155-56.
Thus, even though those parties could not agree upon the subsequent writing, they were
nonetheless bound by their agreement. Conley v. Whittlesey, 126 Idaho 630, 633, 888 P.2d 804,
807 (Ct.App.1995). This case is a far cry from Kohring. Admittedly, Kohring dealt with an oral
agreement and here there is a written order but the contractual principles and the logic of the case
are still sound. Sondra assented to a temporary agreement that was to last only until the trial to
permit Robert to pursue the loan modification. She further agreed not to pursue a short sale.
There was no agr,~ement that she convey the property to Robert. Robert's argument that she was
contractually obl.igated under Paragraph 28 of the PSA to cooperate and grant the deed is
misleading. Respondent's Brief, p. 8. That provision applies to a refinance. A loan modification
is not a refinance. Sondra's name would not be removed from the debt if the loan modification
were not approved and perhaps not even if it was. There was no escrow account established to
hold the deed but rather it was to be recorded and the conveyance completed. Even if Paragraph
28 did apply, Sondra's cooperation was only required "after review of the refinancing documents
and terms by her attorney and/or accountant." R., Vol. I, p. 40,

,r 28.

No documents were ever

presented to Sondra regarding the loan modification.
Thus, Robert's reliance upon the September 12, 2013 agreement as a justification for his
or the district court's actions is misplaced. The district court stated during its consideration of
the fees issue, "I agree with Mr. Anderson that she never agreed to give him a deed." Tr., Vol.

Appellant/Cross-Respondent's Reply Brief

pg. 7

II., p.56, LL 5-6. Nevertheless, both Robert and the district court persisted in the pursuit of one.
B.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION TO DISMISS AS A SANCTION WAS

AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
Respondent's brief directs this Court to several points in the record where the district
court discussed discretion. That issue was fully briefed by Sondra in her initial submission.
Sondra does not dispute that the district court attempted to address the concept. However, saying
the word "discretion" is not a substitute for applying the doctrine. Having perceived the issue as
one of discretion, the district court was obligated to apply the law in its analysis. It is an abuse of
discretion for the court not to "identify and apply the law to the facts found." Southern Idaho

Production Credit Ass 'n v. Astorquia, 113 Idaho 526, 528, 746 P .2d 985, 987 (1987). In this
case, the district court never identified or applied any legal authority in rendering sanctions
against Sondra. Even if this Court determines otherwise, the district court failed to apply that
law to the facts. The evidence before the district court was that the loan modification was being
processed by Bank of America. R., Vol. V, p. 1024, LL 27-32. Nonetheless, the district court
persisted in rendering sanctions. As an intermittent justification, the district court assumed that
no sale could culminate unless Sondra was on title to the property. There was no evidence of
any thwarted sale presented to the district court nor it that assumption valid. LaPeter could have
simply deeded the property to the prospective buyer without any need for a reconveyance.
The Greenhaw v. Whitehead's, Inc., 67 Idaho 262, 175 P.2d 1007 (1946), case cited by
Robert for the proposition that dismissal is an available remedy is not controlling on this issue
and was based on antiquated holdings regarding the necessity of a personal injury plaintiff to
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submit to physical examination. Those cases have been supplanted by changes in the rules of
civil procedure including I.R.C.P. 35. In point of fact, the Court in Greenhaw reversed and
remanded the trial court's decision to dismiss the case. Id., 67 Idaho at 267, 175 P.2d at 1015.
C.

THE MAGISTRATE COURT HAS AND HAD ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

OVER THE PARTIES AND, THUS, THE DISTRICT COURT'S DISMISSAL WAS PROPER
AFTER THE MERGER.
The district court lost jurisdiction once the PSA was merged as set forth in Sondra's
initial submission. Divorce proceedings are a class of cases that are within the subject matter
jurisdiction of the Magistrate's Division of the District Courts of the State of Idaho. LC. §§ 12201, 1-2210(1)(d), 1-2214; I.R.C.P. 82(c)(2)(C); Fifth Judicial District Administrative Order
dated March 23, 2009 (Hon. Barry Wood).

In this case, the magistrate court had to have

authority to merge the PSA for the Decree to be effective. As noted in Barley v. Smith, 149
Idaho 171,233 P.3d 102 (2010):
In its Decree, the magistrate court specifically approved the Agreement. It
certainly had the jurisdiction to do so under Idaho Code section 32-713, which
provides that the court, in rendering a decree of divorce, must make an
appropriate order for the disposition of the community property. The court

has the power under Idaho Code § 1-1603 and 1-1901, to enforce its orders. In
this case, because we find that the assets in question-the convertible notes and
stock allocations-were community property at the time of the divorce and
divided pursuant to the Agreement, the magistrate court had jurisdiction to
interpret and enforce the tenns of the Agreement.

Barley, 149 Idaho at 178, 233 P.3d at 109. (Emphasis added.) If one takes Robert's position to
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the extreme -absent any approval of the magistrate court or even an order of the magistrate court
to comply with the contract, there was no disposition of the property and debts in contravention
of I.C. §§ 32-712 and 32-713. Accordingly, the PSA must be considered in interpreting the
propriety of the Supplemental Decree.

In considering the PSA, the parties' intent and the

resulting merger is quite clear. In the alternative, the items covered by the PSA were essentially
omitted assets. Pike v. Pike, 139 Idaho 406, 408, 80 P.3d 342, 344 (Ct.App.2003). Either way,
the magistrate court had original subject matter jurisdiction over the PSA and the community
estate. Using the Respondent's logic, because the magistrate court -sitting as a court of equity in
the divorce proceeding, had properly been vested with subject matter jurisdiction, that
jurisdiction continued over the parties. McHugh v. McHugh, 115 Idaho 198, 199-200, 766 P.2d
133, 134-35 (1988).
The Spencer-Steed v. Spencer case at 115 Idaho 338, 766 P.2d 1219 (1988) cited by
Robert in his Brief is inapposite to the case at bar. Respondent's Brief p. 25. In that case, the
litigants specifically set forth in the contract dissolving their marriage that the agreement would
not be merged into a decree with regard to certain issues including alimony and support of their
adult children. Id., 115 Idaho at 342, 766 P.2d at 1223. The Court found that the express intent
of the parties not to merge those contractual provisions rebutted the presumption in favor of
merger embodied in Phillips v. Phillips, 93 Idaho 384, 387, 462 P .2d 49 (1969). Id., 115 Idaho at
343, 766 P.2d at 1224. As a result, the Court allowed the wife to pursue her claims for alimony
and support of the adult minor children in a separate breach of contract action. Contrary to the
Spencer-Steed case, the Kantors specifically contracted that the PSA could be merged into a
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supplemental order of the divorce court, which was subsequently done.
"Merger is the substitution of rights and duties under the judgment or the decree for those
under the agreement or cause of action sued upon" Davidson v. Soelberg, 154 Idaho 227, 230,
296 P.3d 433, 436 (Ct.App.2013) (quoting Kimball v. Kimball, 83 Idaho 12, 15, 356 P.2d 919,
921 (1960)). The right to enforce the contract through a breach of contract action is supplanted
by the divorce trial court's authority to enforce its order. Id. I.C. § 1-2201.
In any event, Robert is wrongfully asking this Court to rule that the Supplemental Decree
entered by the magistrate court in Blaine County CV-2011-525 is void. That matter is not before
the Court. For purposes of this appeal, the Court's consideration should be limited to the district
court's reaction to the Supplemental Decree. As a concurrent basis, the district court granted
Sondra's Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Robert did not appeal that
issue to this Court.
D.

ADDITIONAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT POINTS FOR THE COURT TO

CONSIDER.
Sondra addressed the summary judgment errors in her initial brief and there are only a
few additional points this Court should consider in light of Respondent's briefing.
1) The implied term for time for performance regarding payment of the credit
card debt is not limited in its application by the PSA.
"Where parties to a contract do not expressly identify the time for its performance, 'the
law implies that it shall be performed within a reasonable time as determined by the subject
matter of the contract, the situation of the parties, and the circumstances attending the
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performance."' JvfcCormich Intern. USA, Inc. v. Shore, 152 Idaho 920, 925, 277 P.3d 367, 372
(2012) (quoting Curzon v. Wells Cargo, Inc., 86 Idaho 38, 43, 382 P.2d 906, 908 (1963)). The
passage cited by Robert from Hull v. Giesler is misleading. Hull v. Giesler, 156 Idaho 765, 778,
331 P.3d 507, 520 (2014). The Hull case actually acknowledges that implied timeframes are
questions of fact. Id. Thus, the district court's decision on summary judgment was improper
because Sondra was entitled to have factual inferences construed in her favor. The case was set
for a jury trial.
2)

The issue of the Exclusive Resorts Password should be treated no differently

than the execution of the short sale extension document.
Robert cites Terharr v. Joint Class A. Sch. Dist., 77 Idaho 112, 289 P.2d 623
(1955) in support of the proposition that the Exclusive Resorts Password was rendered moot by
an agreement of the parties. Sondra acknowledges that the mootness doctrine applies to this case
in several areas. See, Freeman v. Idaho Dept. of Correction, 138 Idaho 872, 875-76, 71 P.3d 471,
474-75 (Ct.App. 2003). However, the district court's analysis of the breach of contract case with
regard to signing the short sale document focused on whether or not a justiciable controversy
existed at the time the complaint was filed. It is an abuse of discretion for the district court to
apply that logic haphazardly. Sondra had valid claims for the credit cards, the airline miles, the
password and other issues that were summarily bypassed by the district court in its analysis.
3)

The issue of the airline miles was disputed by Sondra to the district court.

Robert inaccurately states in his Response Brief that Sondra's claim with regard
to the airline miles was not raised by her before the district court or it was somehow resolved by
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the September 26, 2013 agreement. R., Vol. II, p. 318, ,r 4; R., Vol. III, p. 570.
E.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ROBERT ATTORNEY

FEES.
Sondra incorporates her arguments from her original submission in response to the
Respondent's Cross Appeal. There was no prevailing party in the district court "action". I.R.C.P.
3. The district court even acknowledged the action was never resolved. Tr., Vol. II, p. 58, Ll. 4-6.
There can be no prevailing party until the merits of the lawsuit have been decided and there is a
final judgment. Howard v. Perry, 141 Idaho 139, 143, 106 P.3d 465, 469 (2009); Straub v.

Smith, 145 Idaho 65, 71-72, 175 P.3d 754, 760-61 (2007) (Jones, J., Horton, J., Eismann, J.,
concurring). Accordingly, an award of attorney fees under the contract is not appropriate. In
determining the prevailing party, the court "shall in its sound discretion consider the final
judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties." I.R.C.P.
54(d)(l)(B); I.R.C.P. 54(e)(2) (referring back to Rule 54(d)(l)(B) for determining the prevailing
party when deciding entitlement to attorney fees); Action Collection Serv., Inc. v. Haught, 146
Idaho 300, 305, 193 P .3d 460, 465 (Ct.App. 2008). "Mere dismissal of a claim without a trial
does not necessarily mean that the party against whom the claim was made is a prevailing party
for the purpose of awarding costs and fees." Chenery v. Agri-Lines Corp., 106 Idaho 687, 692,
682 P.2d 640,645 (Ct.App. 1984).
Attorney fees may be awarded even if the case is not fully decided on the merits only in
limited circumstances. Allied Bail Bonds, Inc. v. County of Kootenai, 151 Idaho 405, 414, 258
P .3d 340, 349 (2011 ). The Allied Bail Bonds case is distinguishable from the case at bar because
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in Allied Bail Bonds, the district court dismissed each and every count on either jurisdictional or
substantive grounds. Id. Although there may not have been an evidentiary hearing or a decision
on the merits, the district court in that case ruled on each claim in a substantive manner. In this
case, the district court acknowledged that Sondra was free to pursue her claims before the
magistrate.
Robert asserts that the district court erred in failing to award "all" attorney fees and costs
in reliance upon Zenner v. Holcomb, 147 Idaho 444, 451, 210 P.3d 552, 559 (2009). However,
this Court cautioned in Zenner, that contractual language does not give an "unqualified right to
unlimited attorney fees." Id. In this case, Robert concedes that Sondra's counterclaim was not
resolved.

To stipport his request for fees, he relies most heavily upon the district court's

determination thvt Sondra "provoked" the filing of the breach of contract claim. Again, Sondra
signed the extem: 1011 document within two hours of the suit being filed. As acknowledged by
Robert's counsel, Robert persisted with the suit even though Mr. Welsh indicated he would
speak with Sondra about signing the document. R., Vol. I, pp. 68-69. Sondra did sign the
document the next day but by then the suit has already been mailed to Blaine County. R., Vol. I,
p. 75. The amount of attorney fees awarded by the Court in excess of $19,000 let alone the
$63,000 claimed by Robert constitute an unconscionable penalty. Clampitt v. A.MR. Corp., 109
Idaho 145, 148, 706 P.2d 34, 37 (1985).
In the alternative, if the district court's prevailing party analysis is upheld over Sondra's
arguments, the district court's award of fees should be constrained to "that action" in accordance
with the terms of the PSA. The only action that Robert was detennined to have prevailed upon
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ultimately was his breach of contract claim. Thus, the award of fees should be limited to what
fees were actually incurred by Sondra "provoking" the initial filing. Kaelker v. Turnbull, 127
Idaho 262, 266, 899 P.2d 972, 976 (1995) (holding only attorney fees recoverable as damages
are those directly attributable to cause of action). Tr., Vol. II, p. 61, LI. 3-19, p. 62, LI. 8-25.
As set forth above, the district court wrongfully concluded that Robert had prevailed on
other claims during the summary judgment proceedings as part of its analysis on fees. Tr., Vol.
II., p. 58, I. 18 - p. 59, l. 19. Because those issues were incorrectly decided, the district court's
prevailing party analysis is flawed.
III. CONCLUSION

In conclm.-ion, Sondra respectfully requests that the decision by district court to dismiss
her counterclaims as a sanction be set aside. There is no need to remand this case for further
proceedings as this Court can simply rule that the dismissal as a sanction was in err but the
concurrent grounds for dismissal was proper. Additionally, the attorney fee award should be
vacated.
IV. ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

Additionally Sondra asks that this Court order Robert to pay her attorney fees and costs
0

on this appeal pursuant to LA.R. 41. Sondra's claim for fees and cost is based upon LC.§ 12-121
and Paragraph 29 of the PSA. As to LC.§ 12-121, Sondra acknowledges that even though this is
a matter of first impression, in part, that the district court's findings were so clearly in error that
any defense of this matter is frivolous, unreasonable and without foundation. Gonzalez v.
Thacker, 148 Idaho 879, 884, 231 P .3d 524, 529 (2009); Contra, Taylor v. AJA Services Corp.,
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151 Idaho 552,574,261 P.3d 829,851 (2011). With regard to the claim for fees under the PSA,
Sondra asserts a claim recognizing that the Court may conclude (as she urges it to do) that the
action is not concluded. Accord, Puckett v. Verska, 144 Idaho 160, 170, 158 P .3d 93 7, 946
(2007). However, Sondra contends that should she prevail on this Appeal, that the Court can
nevertheless award her fees and costs regarding this appeal. Allied Bail Bonds, 151 Idaho at 414,
258 P.3d at 349.

,,,..___
,/

DATED this _ _ day of April, 2015.
THOMPSON, SMITH, WOOLF ANDERSON,
WILKINSON & BIRCH, PLLC

vz _,,

/

~
c
__..~

By:

Marty R. ~
Attorney for Appellant/
Cross-Respondent, Sondra Kantor
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL, HAND DELIVERY
ORF ACSIMILE TRANSMISSION
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was on this
date served upon the persons named below, at the addresses set out below their name, either by
mailing, hand delivery or by facsimile to them a true and correct copy of said document in a
properly addressed envelope in the United States mail, postage prepaid; by hand delivery to
them; or by facsimile transmission.
v

DATED this

l 3,. &y
, of April, 2015.

Scot M. Ludwig, Esq.
LUDWIG SHOUFLER MILLER
JOHNSON, LLP

~ Mailed

401 West Front Street, Suite 401
Boise, Idaho 83702
Facsimile: (208)-387-1999
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